Suggested Citation: Ciaglia, Sarah; Heinemann, Friedrich (2012) : Debt rule federalism: The case of Germany, ZEW Discussion Papers, No. 12-067, Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW), Mannheim, http://nbn-resolving. de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-326197 This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/66119
Nontechnical Summary
In 2009, Germany has introduced a new debt brake which aims at constraining the buildup of new public debt for both the federal and the state level. While the new rule is enshrined in the federal constitution, the Grundgesetz, the sixteen states have leeway on how to mirror these national rules in their state constitutions and budgetary state laws.
It is the objective of this contribution to shed light on this issue and to ask to which extent German states' debt rules differ. Germany is without doubt an important example of debt rule federalism since the German debt brake has had a strong impact on the design of the rules agreed upon in the European Fiscal Compact. In our analysis we go beyond a mere qualitative description of institutional differences and develop a quantitative indicator which expresses the strictness of the debt rules. The indicator's construction follows approaches developed in the current literature to compare the strictness of fiscal rules across countries.
Our results point towards a considerable heterogeneity of budgetary rules across
German states in spite of the existence of the overall federal constitutional rule. For example, states differ with respect to the legal basis of their debt rules, the rule's precision, the chosen flexibility provisions and its comprehensiveness. Furthermore, only in the poorest states the rules' credibility gains from effective sanction provisions as these states risk the loss of transfers if they do not adhere to the rules. This partially explains that, according to our indicator, the strongest rules are currently to be found in financially weak states (Schleswig-Holstein, Saxony-Anhalt and Saarland). However, this advantage will partially expire in the year 2020 when the financial consolidation support and with it the specific threat of sanctions end.
From 2020 on, according to the current state of legislation Rhineland-Palatinate (index value of 0.78) has the strongest rule, followed by Saxony (0.67), SchleswigHolstein (0.67) and Hesse (0.66). Rhineland-Palatinate, Schleswig-Holstein and Hesse implemented the rule in their state constitutions. What makes Rhineland-Palatinate outstanding is that its rule also covers special funds and public enterprises. This raises the index scores significantly.
Introduction
Federal structures provide the potential that sub-national jurisdictions follow individual policies which, compared to a unitary government, can better be tailored according to heterogeneous voter preferences. This chance, however, may imply a risk when it comes to the need of credible and consistent country-wide constitutional rules. If a country tries to enhance its fiscal credibility through new budgetary rules, a transposition leeway of sub-national jurisdictions could weaken these rules' effectiveness and credibility.
This risk can be assumed to be particularly present in countries with a high degree of constitutional autonomy of sub-national jurisdictions. This problem has been present in Europe since the establishment of the Euro and the Stability and Growth Pact. Rules which were designed to commit EU member countries suffered from a deficient transposition in the federal context of member countries. In the current European debt crisis, governments are struggling to strengthen or regain market confidence through more credible fiscal rules such as agreed upon in the Fiscal Compact. But, here again, federal structures may complicate the establishment of consistent and credible fiscal institutions.
Germany is a federal country for which these considerations are relevant, too, and is thus a promising case study. In 2009, Germany has introduced a new debt brake which aims at constraining the build-up of new public debt for both the federal and the state level. While the new rule is enshrined in the federal constitution, the Grundgesetz, the sixteen states have leeway on how to mirror these national rules in their state constitutions and budgetary state laws. Although the Grundgesetz' debt brake is immediately binding for the states as well, the individual state transposition could create quite a diverse set of effective fiscal rules across German states.
It is the objective of this contribution to shed light on this issue and to ask to which extent German states' debt rules differ. Germany is without doubt a particularly interesting and important example of debt rule federalism since the German debt brake has had a strong impact on the design of the rules agreed upon in the Fiscal Compact. In our analysis we go beyond a mere qualitative description of institutional differences and develop a quantitative indicator which expresses the strictness of the debt rules. The indicator's construction follows approaches developed in the current literature to compare the strictness of fiscal rules across countries.
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Our results point towards a considerable heterogeneity of budgetary rules across
German states in spite of the existence of the overall federal constitutional rule. For example, states differ with respect to the legal basis of their debt rules, the rule's precision, the chosen flexibility provisions and its comprehensiveness. Furthermore, only in the poorest states the rules' credibility gains from effective sanction provisions as these states risk transfers if they do not adhere to the rules. This partially explains that, according to our indicator, the strongest rules are to be found in financially weak states (Schleswig-Holstein, Saxony-Anhalt and Saarland). However, this advantage will expire in the year 2020 when the financial consolidation support ends. A possible reason for the lack of ambition in some states would point to the disincentives of German federalism: Due to bailout-guarantees enshrined in German federalism, German states do not have incentives to impress bond markets through particularly strict budgetary rules.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: In section 2, we describe the new German constitutional debt brake. Section 3 summarizes the fiscal rules literature and derives the construction of our Strength of a Fiscal Rule Indicator. Section 4 presents the individual analyses for the German states and the indicator's quantification.
Section 5 summarizes the results and draws some conclusions.
The German debt brake
In 2009 Bundestag and Bundesrat decided to implement a stricter budget rule in the federal constitution (Grundgesetz, GG). It includes constraints on the level of the structural deficit for both the federal government (deficit must not exceed 0.35% of the GDP, binding from 2016 onwards) and the states (deficit must be zero or in surplus from 2020 onwards, Art. 143d (1) GG). Since in principle the rule prohibits new net borrowing it is called "debt brake".
The so called "Stability Council" monitors compliance with the budget rules and with the regulations according to the Consolidation Assistance Act (Konsolidierungshilfengesetz, KonsHilfG, based on Art. 109a GG). The Council comprises the finance ministers of each state, the federal ministers of finance and of economic affairs.
Every state and the federal government have one vote each; the federal ministers share 4 one vote. However, the federal government has a veto: decisions require a two-thirds majority of the states and the vote of the federal government. Decisions can concern the definition of common measures and benchmarks or the official identification of a rule violation by a member. In the latter case, the Council member representing the violatora state or the federal government -has no voting right. In case of an identified violation, the Council sets up a stability programme together with the respective government and monitors its enforcement.
However, the Stability Council does not dispose of means to sanction misbehaviour, only for those states that receive temporary financial assistance. These states are considered not to be able to achieve a balanced budget in 2020 on their own, these are:
Berlin, Bremen, Saarland, Saxony-Anhalt and Schleswig-Holstein (Art. 143d (2) GG). In return, the states agreed to reduce their structural deficit 1 along yearly decreasing limits ( § 2 (1) KonsHilfG). If a state does not comply with these limits, financial support is cut off ( § 1 (3) sentence 3 KonsHilfG). Each, the federal government and all states -including those receiving financial support -pay half of the total yearly amount of 800 Mio.
Euro (Art. 143d (3) GG).
The German debt brake has been discussed controversially among scholars of economics and law. On the one hand the rule is regarded as a step forwards: compared to its predecessor the new rule is considered to be "balanced and effective" (Feld, 2010, p. 241) . Up to the 2009 reform the German constitution prescribed a 'golden rule' with net borrowing limited to the level of gross public investment. 2 Its effectiveness was massively impaired by the existence of a very general escape clause: declaring a 'macroeconomic disequilibrium' was sufficient to legitimate a violation of the general principle.
Since any significant level of unemployment, trade balance, inflation or poor growth was sufficient for such an assessment the old rule has not been an effective constraint. Between 1991 and 2005 the federal level missed the golden rule in seven and the states in 68 cases (Feld, 2010, p. 232) . With this reference point, the new debt brake is clearly 1 The calculation of the structural deficit is defined in Consolidation Assistance Act ( § 2 (1) KonsHilfG) and the respective Administrative Agreements (the Verwaltungsvereinbarung (VV) KonsHilfG). The KonsHilfG defines the organisation of the financial supports. Each federal state agrees to an individual administrative agreement with the federal ministry of finance (VV KonsHilfG). These agreements define in detail the calculation of the structural deficit, the process of support and possible sanctions following non-compliance. 2 Some state budget rules still mirror this golden rule. In this context, the Budgetary Principles Act (Haushaltsgrundsätzegesetz, HGrG) determines the term 'investments' (HGrG Art. 20 (3) 2 sentence 2) and is still important for many budget rules in the states and for the federal government until 2015, too. The term 'investment' term is notoriously imprecise and has been interpreted extensively.
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more precise with respect to the deficit ceiling (i.a. no need to define the term 'investment'), the exception clauses and its surveillance.
In spite of the progress made, compared to the pre-2009 situation also the new rule is far away from a perfect solution (Feld, 2010; Sturm, 2011) 
Quantifying the strength and credibility of fiscal rules
A budget rule aims at constraining a state's budget in order to achieve and to maintain a sustainable budgetary stance. Moreover, a convincing budget rule can function as a signal of credibility to borrowers and bond markets (International Monetary Fund, 2009: 5) and may then contribute to limit interest rate spreads. Indeed, there is evidence on the empirical relevance of this channel: Iara and Wolff (2011) and to a particular potential of fiscal rules in countries with a historically low stability culture (measured e.g. on the basis of past inflation performance). weighting is done using a principal component analysis.
These indexes serve as a starting point for our quantification of fiscal rules in the German federal states. However, neither the EU nor the IMF quantification procedure is applicable to the sub-national level in Germany without further qualification. The common national environment of German states precludes any variance for some of the subindexes. This holds, for example for media attention in the case of the EU index, or for monitoring and enforcement in the case of both the IMF and EU index. Furthermore, these existing indexes have some conceptual and methodological imperfections: con-9 ceptually, the EU index considers the qualitative type of a rule, but not its numerical ambition, for example, budget balance rules limiting the deficit to 3% or to 10% of GDP are equally 'good'. Methodologically, the self-assessment of civil servants in responsible ministries is an obvious source of a distortion towards a too favorable assessment.
However, several criteria and elements of both indexes are helpful. We use them and create new ones to set up a specialised index to quantify the credibility of fiscal rules in the German federal states. Table 1 gives an overview of the index composition.
Our index is based on a two-dimensional approach. First, we differentiate between four 'parts' of a rule and, second, between five 'categories'. For the first dimension, we use the distinction made by Schaltegger and Frey (2004) between four parts of a rule:
(1) the basic rule describes the aim of a budget rule, e.g. a balanced budget;
(2) regulations describe details of this rule, how it should operate and to which parts of the budget it has to be applied;
(3) relaxations describe conditions under which a state can deviate from the rule; (4) sanctions determine enforcement mechanisms to guarantee the implementation of the rule and to punish non-compliance.
With respect to the second dimension, we use five categories to describe the formal nature and the content of a rule. The aim is to mirror the credibility of a rule. The higher the credibility the higher the scores assigned. Four categories assess formal characteristics and one category tries to capture the precision and stringency of the rule's content. This index tries to assess the part of government expenditures that are covered by a budget rule. The more complete the coverage of expenditures the less opportunities exist to circumvent the rule by shifting expenditures from a covered to a non-covered part. In the adoption of this category, however, we do not follow the EU index' example which uses the share of total expenditure covered. This share might be vulnerable to strong changes over time. The problem is that the expenditure share may rather quantify the effects of a rule rather than its content. For example, expenditures for establishing a special fund in one year might decrease the ratio of coverage but the score will increase in the next year although the rule did not get 'better'. Therefore, we set up another measure to assess the degree of coverage which is a count variable adding up the types of public expenditure covered by the rule:
(C) Category C, 'Coverage', is calculated as a count variable which adds 1 point for each of the following kinds of total government budget which is covered by the fiscal rule under scrutiny: the official state budget (as decided by the parliament), state owned enterprises, special funds and financial support for local authorities. Thus, the rating ranges from 1 (only official state budget covered) to 4 (total government expenditures covered). The second part, 'strict aim', examines whether regulations, relaxations and sanctions of a budget rule are sufficiently strict to meet the aim laid down in the basic rule. Here, we qualitatively judge the content of a rule. If, for example, the flexibility clauses -although existent and clearly defined -allow deviations too often, it is hardly possible that the basic rule is followed regularly.
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The rating ranges between 0 -no strict regulations -and 2 -regulations that are strict enough.
The third part, 'strict rule', tries to judge the ambition of the rule. Taking the provisions of the federal debt brake as a reference point, the score ranges from 0 to 2. A rule that is as strict as the federal rule gets 1 point. A rule that is even stricter gets 2, a rule that is less strict 0 points. This measure takes into account that states could want to implement a stricter rule. Hereby, we can ac-5 Category D only assesses whether there are flexibility clauses. We consider them as a necessary part of a budget rule because they guaranty a certain stability of the budget rule. If there were no flexibility clauses the budget rule would be probably changed during an economic shock. However, the flexibility clauses should not allow too much flexibility; the budget rule must be applied in 'normal times' to remain credible. Thus our indicator covers the full trade-off of flexibility: on the one hand a rigid rule is not credible, on the other hand flexibility must not lead to arbitrariness.
count for the quality of a rule without falling to normative judgements of 'good'
or 'bad'. The points assigned to each of the three parts sum up to the rating of category E.
In order to follow the construction of the index' score precisely, we first examine each of the four parts of a rule separately. All points of a category sum up across all parts and are translated into a percentage value. The mean of the percentage values of all categories form the index score.
We would like to stress that this quantification approach can be applied to a state rule independently from its specific type, i.e. whether the rule refers to the budget balance, the stock of debt or the level of expenditure. 6 In any case where a state has installed a combination of these different types we assess their joint operation since these rules interact and complement each other.
Overall, the index is supposed to cover the dimensions which affect the credibility of fiscal rules. Of course, this index suffers from the usual caveats of index construction: the weighting is somehow arbitrary and while some index points can be assigned quite objectively, for others the assessment implies some subjectivity.
The German states' fiscal rules: description and quantification
The following chapter describes the states' budget rules in detail and quantifies the index value for each of them applying the above defined method. .) differentiate between: -a budget balance rule which determines a limit to the budget balance; -a debt rule which targets the stock of debt that has been accumulated up until a certain date; -an expenditure rule which limits the amount of expenditures or the growth of expenditures, and -a revenue rule which limits either the whole revenue magnitude or certain parts of it, e.g. tax income. Revenue rules currently do not play a role in German states. 7 An exemplary detailed construction sheet for Baden-Württemberg can be found in the Appendix, the full set of state sheets is available as web appendix: www.zew.de/debtrulesDP012-067
is an automatic mechanism but covers only a very small part of the budget. Furthermore, the states need to comply with the Budget Principles Act (Haushaltsgrundsätzegesetz, HGrG). This act prescribes how the budget needs to be designed and specifies the calculation of the term 'budget'. However, the states are free to implement stricter rules. We do not consider declarations of intent in the midterm financial plans or similar documents since they are too easy to change and would therefore bias the index score. 3). The revenue rule allows running deficits to respond to "demands of the macroeconomic equilibrium" or similar severe situations (LHO Art. 18 (2) sentence 1). The amount of borrowing must not exceed the sum of expenditures for investments (LHO Art. 18 (2) sentence 1). Borrowing above that limit is allowed in case of a "disturbance of the macroeconomic equilibrium" (LHO Art. 18 (2) sentence 2). The parliament must clarify that this case exists or soon will and that borrowing will help to repel it (LHO Art. 18 (2) sentence 2). Baden-Württemberg is allowed to exceed the debt limit if the tax income decreases by 1% compared to the preceding year and in case of natural catastrophes or similar severe emergencies (LHO Art. 18 (3)). If these exceptions come into use, the parliament must decide a redemption plan for at most seven years to pay the extra debt back (LHO Art. 18 (4)).
Although the restrictions seem strict, some legal terms are not specified sufficiently. The interpretation of a 'disturbance of the macroeconomic equilibrium' is up to the parliament's simple majority and therefore vulnerable to manipulations. (3)). Nonetheless, the budget rule is stricter than the one proposed by the Grundgesetz. The numerically determined debt stock will decrease in real terms because of inflation. The use of exception clauses must be followed by a complete redemption. Both elements seem to guarantee stable budgets and provide credibility. However, there are no strict enforcement mechanisms. Baden-Württemberg has an index score of 0.65. The terms describing exceptions to BayHO Art. 18 (1) correspond to "extraordinary demands" as determined by the constitution. However, no clear definition is given so that the exception is vulnerable to manipulations, because their interpretation is up to the parliament's simple majority. The main aim is to set up balanced budgets, but only on a 'regular' basis. This term does not say anything about the time span of exceptions to this rule nor redemption arrangements . Also, the definition of "investments" (LHO Art. 13 (3) No 2 sentence 2, same as in HGrG) is not specified.
The rule does not consider state owned enterprises, special funds or recipients of grants (LHO Art. 26). Nonetheless, the rule corresponds to the one the Grundgesetz specifies for the Bundesländer, but it suffers from imprecise definitions. The index score is 0.50.
Berlin (BE)
Berlin abstained from the vote for the federal debt brake in the Bundesrat. The reasons are quite similar to those expressed to keep the current legal provisions in Berlin as they are. 11 The government does not approve prohibiting borrowing -although it is up to the Bundesländer to define exception clauses -because there might be situations where borrowing could be necessary. Also, Berlin considers the financial support given to some states as too small (Berliner Abgeordnetenhaus, 2009). Berlin did not change its budget rule, yet. It is close to the former federal budget rule.
Berlin has a budget balance rule. Borrowing is only allowed if other financial means are not "available" (constitution Art. 87 (2)). The amount of borrowing must not exceed the amount of expenditures for investments. Higher borrowing is allowed to respond to a "disturbance of the macroeconomic equilibrium" (constitution Art. 87
(2)). The parliament must determine that the disturbance exists and that borrowing will help to repel it (LHO Art. 18 (1)). Since Berlin is a recipient of financial support according to KonsHilfG, it is forced to decrease its deficit to zero at least in 2020 (VV KonsHilfG). If Berlin does not comply with these limits and if there is no "exceptional situation" approved by the Stability Council, financial support is cut off (VV KonsHilfG Art. 6). Furthermore, the coalition agreed to reduce expenditures yearly by 0.3% (compared to the previous year, Finanzsenat Berlin, 2011) . This expenditure rule is defined in a coalition agreement and implemented in the budget plan law.
Berlin's budget rule is hardly credible. Borrowing is allowed as long as other financial means are not available. Thus, no reasons must be given to take loans. The limit is not clear, too, since 'investments" are not specifically defined (LHO Art. 13 (3) No 2 sentence 2, same as in HGrG). Also, the term 'macroeconomic equilibrium' and its disturbance are not specified. The rule does not consider special funds, state owned enterprises and recipients of grants (LHO Art. 26). The VV KonsHilfG is much more explicit and helps Berlin to gain credibility: if the government does not follow definite numerical deficit limits, the support is cut off. Thanks to the provisions in VV KonsHilfG Berlin gets an index score of 0.66. However, the financial support ends in 2019 and then the index score will -if nothing changes -fall back to 0.46 in 2020.
Brandenburg (BB)
Brandenburg approved the federal debt brake in the Bundesrat, although it does not have similar legal provisions, yet. 12 The budget rule in Brandenburg still resembles the former federal rule. Borrowing is allowed up to the amount of expenditures for investments (constitution Art. 103 (1) sentence 2). Hereby, the budget must consider "demands of the macroeconomic equilibrium" and the "protection of natural living conditions of present and future generations" (constitution Art. 101 (1)). Higher borrowing is allowed to respond to a "disturbance of the macroeconomic equilibrium"
(constitution Art. 103 (1) sentence 3). Then, the parliament must determine that this disturbance exists and that borrowing will help to repel it (LHO Art. 18 (1)).
As it is the case for all other Bundesländer having this kind of a budget rule, key terms ("investments", "macroeconomic equilibrium", its "demands" and "disturbance") are not clearly determined. However, Brandenburg defines the term "investments" more precise as expenditures that "maintain, extend or improve means of production of the whole economy" (VV-HS 3.2.1.1, LHO Art. 13 (3) No 2 sentence 2).
The rule does not consider special funds, state owned enterprises or recipients of grants (constitution Art. 101 (2), LHO Art. 26). The index score is 0.53.
Bremen (HB)
Bremen voted for the federal debt brake in the Bundesrat, although it does not have a similar budget rule, yet. 13 The current rule is close to the former federal budget rule.
It is complemented by a budget balance rule according to VV KonsHilfG. Borrowing is allowed up to the amount of expenditures for investments (constitution Art. 131a sentence 2). Higher borrowing is possible in case of a "disturbance of the macroeconomic equilibrium" (constitution Art. 131a sentence 2). As it is the case in most states having this type of rule, the terms "investments" (vague definition in LHO Art. 13 (3) No 2 sentence 2, same as in HGrG), "macroeconomic equilibrium" and its "disturbance" are not defined clearly. They let a lot of scope for interpretation. Also, the rule does not consider borrowing by special funds, state owned enterprises and recipients of grants (LHO Art. 26). According to KonsHilfG, Bremen has to comply with decreas-12 Two-thirds of the parliament´s members can change the constitution (constitution Art. 79). Also, the bill could be approved in a referendum. Two-thirds of all participants and at least half of those eligible to vote must vote for it (constitution Art. 78). 13 The constitution can be changed by a two-thirds majority of the parliament's members (constitution Art. 125 (3)). Also, the majority of the parliament's members could request a referendum (constitution Art. 70 (1)). More than half of those people eligible to vote must vote in favour of the bill to approve it (constitution Art. 72 (2)). (1)). Exceptions can be made in case of "extraordinary demands" (constitution Art. 72 (1)). The LHO specifies this term by allowing exceptions in case the "macroeconomic equilibrium" is disturbed (LHO Art. 18 (1)).
The rule is not that strict. The use of exceptions must hardly be justified and the rule relies on unspecified terms like "investments" (LHO Art. 13 (3) No 2 sentence 2; same as in HGrG), "macroeconomic equilibrium", its "demands" and "disturbance".
The rule does not apply to special funds, state owned enterprises and recipients of grants (LHO Art. 26). The rule's index score is 0.44.
Hesse (HE)
Hesse voted in favour of the federal debt brake in the Bundesrat. In 2011, a corresponding constitutional amendment for Hesse has been decided by a referendum.
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The new rule first applies in 2020 (constitution Art. 161). The LHO is valid until the end of 2012, a new version has not been decided, yet. The current rule is close to the former federal rule and allows borrowing up until the amount of expenditures for investments 17 and beyond that in case of "extraordinary demands" (constitution Art.
141). The index score for this rule is 0.50.
14 The constitution can be changed by a three-fourths majority of the parliament's members and a two-thirds majority of the participants in a referendum (constitution Art. 51 (2)). The parliament has to approve the bill two times (with the named majorities) with a period of 13 days between both decisions (constitution Art. 51 (2)). Also, the people of Hamburg can initiate a petition for a referendum with 10.000 signatures of those that are eligible to vote. If the parliament does not approve the bill within four months, it must conduct a petition for a referendum. At least a twentieths of the people eligible to vote must approve the petition. In the referendum two-thirds of the people that participate in the vote and two-thirds of the votes represented in the current parliament must approve the bill (constitution Art. 50). 15 HmbGVBl. Nr. 23, 08/06/2012, p. 204 . 16 70% of all participants approved the bill (Hessisches Statistisches Landesamt, 2011) . To change the constitution, the parliament must approve the bill by simple majority and half of the voters in a referendum must vote for it (constitution Art. 123 sentence 2). 17 The constitution uses the term "advertising ends" (constitution Art. 141), what means quite the same as 'investments'.
The new rule prescribes a balanced budget without borrowing "in principle" (constitution Art. 141 (1)). Exceptions are allowed to account for business cycle fluctuations in a "symmetric" way (constitution Art. 141 (3)). This term implies that borrowings must be balanced by surpluses across the business cycle. In case of natural catastrophes or extraordinary emergencies -situations which reasons must lay outside the scope of control of the state -borrowing above these limits is allowed (constitution Art. 141 (4) sentence 1). The parliament must decide a redemption plan at the same time (constitution Art. 141 (4) sentences 2). The loans must be paid back in an "appropriate" period of time (constitution Art. 141 (4) sentences 3).
The provisions of the old rule are vulnerable to manipulation, because key terms are not specified ("investments" (LHO Art. 13 (3) No 2 sentence 2, same as in HGrG) and "extraordinary demands"). The new rule is more precise. The basic rule as well as its exception clauses are mainly specified. Although the time span of the redemption plan may be vulnerable to manipulation, the term "appropriate" can be used for an appeal. This would not be the case if no time condition at all would have been prescribed. However, the rule does not consider special funds, state owned enterprises and recipients of grants (LHO Art. 26). The index of this rule is 0.66.
Lower Saxony (NI)
Lower Saxony voted in favour of the federal debt brake in the Bundesrat. However, it does not have a similar rule, yet. 18 The current rule is close to the former federal rule.
Borrowing is allowed up until the amount of expenditures for investments and debt conversion (constitution Art. 71 sentence 2). Exceptions are possible to respond to a "disturbance of the macroeconomic equilibrium" or to an "immediate threat to the natural living conditions" (constitution Art. 71 sentence 3). The parliament must define a situation as exceptional and make clear that borrowing will help to repel it (LHO Art.
18 (1)). The budget rule is hardly credible, because key terms ("investments" (LHO Art. 13 (3) No 2 sentence 2, same as in HGrG), "disturbance of the macroeconomic equilibrium" and "immediate threat to the natural living conditions") are not specified.
The rule does not consider special funds, state owned enterprises and recipients of grants (LHO Art. 26). The index score is 0.51.
Mecklenburg-West Pomerania (MV)
Mecklenburg-West Pomerania abstained from the vote on the federal debt brake in the Bundesrat. The government of SPD and CDU has doubts about a prohibition of borrowing for the states in the federal constitution. Also, they argue that states would rather follow constrains that they decided themselves than externally prescribed ones. Financial support payments would initiate wrong incentives because their calculation just considers the debt stock and not the efforts a state has made so far to reduce it, the economic situation and the financial strength of the state. Furthermore, the distribution of financial policy competencies between the federal level and the states is not settled, yet (Bundesrat, 2009: 244) . The parliament of MecklenburgWest Pomerania implemented a new budget rule in the constitution in 2011. 19 It will first apply in 2020 (constitution Art. 79a). The LHO is not renewed, yet.
The current rule resembles the former federal debt rule: borrowing is allowed up to the amount of expenditures for investments and beyond that in case of a "disturbance of the macroeconomic equilibrium" or an immediate threat to the "economic and labour market development". The parliament has to justify the use of exceptions by defining the situation as exceptional and clarifying that borrowing will be helpful (constitution Art. 65 (2)). This rule's index score is 0.46.
According to the new rule (constitution Art. 65 (2)) the budget must be balanced without borrowing "in principle". Exceptions are possible to respond to business cycle fluctuations in a "symmetric" way. These situations must be compared to several similar situations years ago. Exceptions can also be made to respond to natural catastrophes or exceptional emergencies that lay outside the scope of control of the state and affect the budget considerably. In both cases, the parliament must simultaneously set-up a redemption plan that regulates paying back the debt in an "appropriate" period of time.
The current rule is vulnerable to exploitations. Key terms ("investments" (LHO Art. 13 (3) No 2 sentence 2, same as in HGrG), "disturbance of the macroeconomic equilibrium" and a threat to the "economic and labour market development") are not specified. The rule does not consider special funds, state owned enterprises or recipients of grants (LHO Art. 26). The new rule does not consider them, too, but is stricter regarding the use of exception clauses and prescribes a redemption plan. Although the term 'appropriate' does not define a concrete period of time, the term helps to appeal the budget. The new LHO should define the term 'business cycle' and how the adaption can be made 'symmetrically'. The new rule is more credible than the old one. Its index score is 0.65.
North Rhine-Westphalia (NW)
North Rhine-Westphalia voted in favour of the federal debt brake in the Bundesrat.
However, its budget rule is similar to the former federal rule. 20 Borrowing is allowed to respond to "demands of the macroeconomic equilibrium". On a "regular basis" borrowing must not exceed the amount of expenditures for investments (constitution Art.
83 sentence 2). Higher borrowing is possible to respond to a "disturbance of the macroeconomic equilibrium" (LHO Art. 18 (1)). In this case the parliament must define that the disturbance exists and that borrowing will help to repel it (LHO Art. 18 (1)).
The rule is not strict, since key terms ("investments" (LHO Art. 13 (3) No 2 sentence 2, same as in HGrG), "demands" and "disturbance of the macroeconomic equilibrium") are not specified. Also, the rule does not consider special funds, state owned enterprises and recipients of grants (LHO Art. 26). The index score is 0.45.
Rhineland-Palatinate (RP)
Rhineland-Palatinate voted in favour of the federal debt brake in the Bundesrat. In 2010, the parliament decided to implement a similar rule in its constitution. 21 The rule first applies in 2020. The current rule is similar to the former federal rule: borrowing is allowed up until the amount of expenditures for investments. Exceptions can be made in order to respond to a "disturbance of the macroeconomic equilibrium" (constitution Art. 117 sentence 2). The parliament must declare a situation as exceptional and give reasons that borrowing would help to repel it (LHO Art. 18 (1)).
The new budget balance rule prescribes that the budget plan must be balanced without borrowing (constitution Art. 117 (1)). Exceptions are allowed in order to balance income differences caused by business cycle fluctuations (constitution Art.
20 The constitution can be changed by a two-thirds majority of the parliament's members (constitution Art. 69 (2)). The parliament can also decide a referendum. It is successful if at least half of the people eligible to vote participate in the vote and two-thirds of them vote for it (constitution Art. 69 (3)). 21 The constitution can be changed by two-thirds of the parliament´s members or during a referendum that must be approved by at least half of the people eligible to vote. (3)). This is unique among German federal states.
Whereas the current rule is vulnerable to manipulation since key terms ("investments" (LHO Art. 13 (3) No 2 sentence 2, same as in HGrG) and "disturbance of the macroeconomic equilibrium") are not specified, the new rule hardly is, because it is very strict. The term 'business cycle' and the way the budget has to adapt to it are specified and will be defined in a new LHO. The new rule clearly defines exception clauses and prescribes a detailed redemption plan -although without a time limit.
Contrarily to the new rule, the old one does not consider special funds, state owned 
Saarland (SL)
Saarland voted for the federal debt brake in the Bundesrat. However, Saarland still does not have a similar budget rule. 22 Since it gets financial support according to
KonsHilfG it must follow strict deficit limits. The current rule is similar to the former federal rule: borrowing is allowed up to the amount of expenditures for investments (constitution Art. 108 (2)). Exceptions are possible to respond to a "disturbance of the macroeconomic equilibrium" or in case of "extraordinary demands" (Art. 108 (2)). The parliament must define a situation as exceptional and make clear that borrowing will help to repel it (Art. 18 (1)). If the parliament borrows to respond to "extraordinary demands", it needs to define a redemption plan (LHO Art. 18 (1) (1)). Borrowing up until the debt limit is allowed for expenditures for investments and beyond only in case of a "disturbance of the macroeconomic equilibrium" (LHO Art. 18 (2)). In the latter case, the parliament must determine the disturbance and justify that borrowing will help to repel it (LHO Art. 18 (2)). Borrowing above the debt limit is only allowed if tax income decreases by 3% compared to the preceding year or in case of natural catastrophes or similar severe situations with supra-regional impact (LHO Art. 18 (3)). In any case, the parliament must set-up a redemption plan that prescribes repayment within at most five years (LHO Art. 18 (4)).
Saxony's rule is strict, even though it is just implemented in the LHO. Although some key terms ("investments" (LHO Art. 13 (3) No 2 sentence 2, same as in HGrG), "disturbance of the macroeconomic equilibrium"; "natural catastrophes" and "similar severe situations" are quite well defined, they must be supra-regional) are not speci-23 A two-thirds majority of the parliament's members can change the constitution (constitution Art. 74 (2)). Also, the parliament can decide with a simple majority to conduct a referendum. The people of Saxony can demand a referendum, too, if they get at least 450.000 signatures of those people that are eligible to vote (constitution Art. 72 (2)). At least a simple majority of those people eligible to vote need to approve the bill (constitution Art. 74 (3)).
fied, the balanced budget and debt limits will decrease the probability of exploitations.
The parliament has to justify its decisions and these can easily be appealed at the Constitutional Court. However, the rule does not consider special funds, state owned enterprises and recipients of grants (LHO Art. 26). The index score is 0.67.
Saxony-Anhalt (ST)
Saxony-Anhalt voted in favour of the federal debt brake in the Bundesrat. In 2010, the parliament changed the LHO to implement a stricter budget rule -the constitution remained unchanged. 24 Since Saxony-Anhalt receives financial support according to KonsHilfG, it must follow strict deficit limits. The budget plan must be balanced without borrowing (Art. 18 (1)). Exceptions are possible in order to adapt to serious business cycle fluctuations, natural catastrophes or extraordinary emergencies that elude the scope of the state's control (Art. 18 (2)). Simultaneously, the parliament must approve a redemption plan that prescribes the repayment in an "appropriate" scope of time (Art. 18 (3)). Additionally, the debt stock must decrease regularly (Art. 18 (4)). The budget rule is strict: all regulations are implemented in the constitution, most of the key terms are defined ("In principle" considers the named exceptions, "budget" means the structural balance as defined in VV KonsHilfG, "natural catastro-25 Schleswig-Holstein brought this issue to the Federal Constitutional Court in 2010, but it was rejected because of formal reasons. 26 Two-thirds of the parliament's members must approve a constitutional amendment. Also, 5% of the people eligible to vote can demand a referendum. Two-thirds of the voters must approve the bill, at least half of those eligible to vote (constitution Art. 42). 27 Gesetz zur Ausführung von Artikel 53 der Verfassung des Landes Schleswig-Holstein, 29/03/2012. 28 The limits target the structural deficit from 2010 on. The limit for one year decreases by 10% compared to the preceding year.
phes" and "extraordinary emergencies" must be defined by two-thirds of the parliament's members) and there are very strict deficit limits. However, it is not specified how a "symmetric" adaption to business cycle developments would work. The rule does not consider special funds, state owned enterprises (constitution Art. 50 (1)) and recipients of grants (LHO Art. 26). The index score is 0.78. Although it will fall back to 0.67 in 2020 when financial support has ended, it is still among the highest.
Thuringia (TH)
Thuringia voted for the federal debt brake in the Bundesrat. In 2009, the parliament decided to implement a stricter debt rule in the LHO -the constitution remained unchanged. 29 The LHO prescribes a budget balance rule. The budget must be balanced without borrowing (LHO Art. 18 (1)). If the total income is less than the average of the last three years, borrowing is allowed up to the amount of income the budget plan had foreseen. Higher borrowing is allowed in case of natural catastrophes or extraordinary emergencies (LHO Art. 18 (2)). Simultaneously, the parliament must decide a redemption plan that prescribes the repayment within five years (LHO Art. 18 (3)).
Additionally, expenditures for the personnel must not exceed 40% of the total expenditures (constitution Art. 98 (3)). The rule is strict: borrowing is constrained and redemption is mandatory. However, the rule does not consider special funds, state owned enterprises and recipients of grants (LHO Art. 26). The index score is 0.66.
Comparison
There is a significant variance of the strength of budget rules among the German federal states according to our index quantification. The index scores range between 0.44 and 0.78. The table below displays all index scores.
Currently, Schleswig-Holstein (0.78) has the strongest rule, followed by Saxony-Anhalt (0.77) and Saarland (0.71). All three states receive financial support. Also, Berlin (0.66) and Bremen (0.65), the two other recipients of support, range in the upper half. In contrast, from 2020 on, when the support is cut off, they score mostly in the lower half -except for Schleswig-Holstein (0.67) and Saxony-Anhalt (0.65) which 29 The constitution can be changed by two-thirds of the parliament's members (constitution Art. 83 (2)). Also, an eighth of the people eligible to vote can demand a referendum (constitution Art. 82 (5) sentence 2). In the referendum, a simple majority of the voters and at least 40% of those eligible to vote must approve the bill.
already implemented a stricter budget rule. The temporary relative strength of these states is explained by the fact that they face monetary sanctions in the period up to 2020. The sanction threat results from the conditionality of the financial consolidation support and ends with these payments in 2019. Interestingly, credible future rules are by no means confined to wealthy states.
A number of poorer states which are recipients in Germany's fiscal equalization system have opted for strict rules to improve their budgetary credibility. And contrary, some of the wealthier states are among those with the less ambitious rules.
Conclusions
This German case study confirms the expectation that national debt rules may not be able to guarantee a homogeneous set of effective fiscal rules across sub-national jurisdictions. In federal countries like Germany the states have constitutional and fiscal autonomy and make use of it also with respect to the definition and specification of a debt brake -the difference between the state with the lowest (Hamburg) and the one with the highest index score (Rhineland-Palatinate) is 0.34 for the future rule.
The detailed analysis reveals striking details: Some states that are heavily indebted or receive financial support do not show much ambition so far. Among the five states that receive consolidation aid payments, only Saxony-Anhalt and SchleswigHolstein implemented a stronger rule to meet the federal debt brake requirements.
The three other countries' rules benefit from a temporary sanction threat. However, this rule strengthening element is temporary and exposed from outside because it is an implication of the federal debt brake.
Thus, some of the highly indebted states miss the chance of using their own legislation to make their fiscal regime more credible. This observation is in line with well-known disincentives of German federalism. Germany's federal jurisdictions form a full bail-out-community. On constitutional grounds, states can be certain that they will be bailed out in case of insolvency. As a consequence, states' bond yields do not differ to any significant extent and there are no incentives to regain capital reputation through better rules. Any such signal does not pay off in terms of financing costs but it may produce political costs. In this sense, the German experience is another example of the general disincentives related to federal institutions based on mutual bailout promises. In the light of the upcoming discussions regarding German fiscal federal institutions, these results should be kept in mind.
Finally, our results are of relevance for all attempts to improve fiscal governance in the euro area through new prescriptions like the Fiscal Compact or the reformed Stability and Growth Pact. A particular attention in the implementation of all these new rules has to be given to the federal dimension. Germany is a clear example, where a seemingly unequivocal country-wide deficit rule does not necessarily create a level budgetary playing field across all sub-national jurisdictions, although judicial ties are a lot stronger than they are at the supranational, European level.
